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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:
Degree:

Collisions : A Legal Analysis
MSc

The Dissertation is detailed legal study of the Law of Collisions, with particular attention
paid to the Collision Regulations.
A look is taken at jurisdiction in general, its application and scope, and then jurisdiction
in a collision case. Issues such as forum non conveniens and choices of law are
examined. Legal remedies such as arrest of vessels and Mareva Injunctions are also
outlined.
Civil Liability is discussed, once again with direct reference to collisions. Thus, the civil
duty of care is outlined, and the specific issues of fault, damages and causation are
investigated. A brief overview of limitation of liability is also included.
Criminal liability is also discussed, with a very general outline of criminal law being
given, including the elements of a crime and strict and vicarious liability. Specific crimes
relative to collision cases are itemised and examined.
A detailed study is made of the Collision Regulations, with special emphasis on the
steering and sailing rules. Case law is used to show the application of the rules, as well
as the result of not following the rules.
The concluding chapter examines some of the arguments for the re-drafting of the
rules, and makes an argument for the retention of the rules as they stand. The point is
made about the necessity for more caution in applying the rules and in manoeuvring the
vessel.

KEYWORDS: Civil Liability, Collisions, Collision Regulations, Criminal Liability,
Jurisdiction, Law.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Man and the sea are interlinked. Not only has the sea provided food for him, but it
has also been an agent of change and development. From the first tentative exploratory
steps taken for adventure, treasure or trade, man has been exposed to her bounty and
her might. Marine casualties are apparently inevitable. They are caused by a variety of
factual situations, and evidentiary circumstances, and have varied (but always
unpleasant) effects on man, his property and the environment.

In the early days of maritime exploration, the weather was man's greatest enemy.
Setting to sea in flimsy crafts, with no way of predicting the weather or of knowing what
lay ahead, it is astounding that as many of the vessels that were able to get through, did.
As travel by sea became more common, however, man became his own worst enemy particularly in the more travelled seas of the world: the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the
Northern Seas. Whereas previously man merely battled the elements and fate to reach
his destination in one piece, now man had to navigate with one eye on the stars and one
on the sea for any approaching craft which might impede his travels. Thus, the man-made
maritime casualty was born. The situation has not changed with time. In fact, it has gotten
worse as more ships, which are larger, faster and more powerful, have begun to ply the
world's waterways.

In an analysis of collisions by Richard Pilley1, it is pointed out that between 1990
and 1996, a total of 123 collision claims were analysed and data was gathered showing
the status of the vessel at the time the collision took place. Not surprisingly, the vast
majority of accidents took place when the vessel was underway, with 20% of them
occurring when the vessel was travelling at excessive speed. (See table 1)

1

Pilley, R. (1996) 'Collisions: some facts and figures'. In Maritime Collision and Prevention. Edited by
Zhao, J., Wilson, P.A., Hu, Z. and Wang, F.

1

Underway 62%
Speeding 23%
Anchoring 9%
Berthing 6%
Other 3%

Table 1: Status of the Ship at the time of Collision
Table 2 shows where the majority of the claims took place. As is to be expected, the
majority of collisions took place in coastal waters and in areas of restricted navigation.
However, open water collisions accounted for a greater proportion of the total value of
claims than those in coastal waters.
Coastal waters
31%
Open Water
22%
River Canal
11%
At Anchorage
7%
In harbour 14%
Separation
Zone 14%
Other 1%

Table 2: Place of Occurrence
For comparative purposes, Table 3 shows the status of the other vessel involved in the
collisions.

2

Underway 55%
At Anchorage
16%
Fishing 14%
Alongside 8%
Other 7%

Table 3: Status of 'Other ship'

Of vital importance to this discussion are the figures on the type of collision: what type of
manoeuvre was the vessel attempting when the collision took place? Table 4 shows that
the majority of vessels involved in these collisions were in a crossing situation.

Crossing 39%
End on 25%
One ship static
20%
Overtaking
10%
Other 6%

Table 4: Type of Collision
Finally, the condition of the sea and the degree of visibility are factors which are thought
to play a vital role in such accidents. These factors undoubtedly contribute in some
respect, but they are not the causative factors in the majority. In 62% of the cases,
visibility was 'good' or 'fair', and in 76% of the cases the sea was 'calm' or 'slight', as
shown in Tables 5 and 6.

3

Good 57%
Poor 38%
fair 5%
-

Table 5: Visibility

Moderate 19%
Rough 5%
Slight 36%
Calm 40%

Table 6: Sea State

Having looked at the figures, it is clear that collisions are taking place for reasons
other than force majeure. It is in order to minimise the amount of avoidable accidents by
collisions that the maritime community has codified and implemented many of the
customary laws of good seamanship into the 'Rules of the Road', or Collision Regulations,
as they are more formally known. These rules form a major part of the body of law for
safe navigation, and stringent adherence to them would indeed minimise the amount of
collisions which occur. However, where collisions do occur, these rules also help to
determine fault and liability and to provide a framework within which the casualty can be
adjudicated.

4

These rules of navigation can be traced back over hundreds of years of
customary practice, but were codified by the Brussels convention of 1910, which gave
birth to the official Collision Regulations in the same year. These have helped significantly
by introducing some consistency to the rules of navigation around the world, particularly
in light of the introduction of traffic separation schemes and radar equipment. However,
since the 1980's, maritime casualties have been rising and the statistical analysis
suggests that about 80% of all shipping accidents are caused by human error. As far as
collisions are concerned, the rate is actually higher. It is my thought that although the
rules are excellent for creating a framework within which to operate, they are useless
without the proper human application. In a survey taken at Shanghai Waters between
1990 and 19952, the vast majority of accidents were caused by either blatant disregard for
the Collision Regulations, or a grave tactical error on the part of those attempting to apply
them. Thus, in one way or another, blame for the vast majority of collisions can be laid at
the feet of human error.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the legal regime governing collisions at
sea. Although the word collision seems simple, it in itself can lead to may other types of
maritime disasters which result from it. Thus a collision may lead to marine pollution by oil
or a noxious substance which can in itself have many repercussions on the marine
environment and the liability of any responsible party. It is also possible for a party to
collide with the sea bottom or a stationary object, which is in itself a collision. These
groundings, alisions and other maritime casualties are beyond the scope of this paper
which seeks to evaluate the law itself as it relates to collisions, and as such will be limited
to collisions between vessels.

The paper seeks to first lay the foundation of the law of collision, by dealing with
jurisdiction in collision cases. Once the juridical basis has been laid, a full and thorough

2

Tianbing, H. and Shaohong, X. (1996) 'Variety of Human Error in Collision Accident'. In Maritime
Collision and Prevention. Edited by Zhao, J.; Wilson, P.; Hu, Z.; and Wang, F.

5

discussion of the various liabilities will be made, including any civil and criminal liability
which may accrue. Then the Collision regulations will be analysed, specifically the sailing
and steering rules (rules 4-19). At the end of this discussion, it is hoped that the reader
will have a full understanding of the law surrounding collisions, and will also see from the
ongoing analysis of the cases, that the majority of these are caused by error on the part
of man. In conclusion, I will outline some of the arguments for and against a dramatic
revision of the Collision Regulations, and hope to emphasise my belief that blind revision
of the regulations will do nothing if the attitude and approach of those who have to apply
them is not improved. To take liberties with the words of Cairns, J. in The Fogo3,
'…It is on men that safety at sea depends, and they cannot make a greater
mistake than to suppose that machines (or the creation of rules) can do their work for
them.'

3

[1967] 2 Ll. Rep 208

6

2.

JURISDICTION IN COLLISION CASES

2.1

JURISDICTION

The Admiralty Court is part of the High Court of Justice in the UK, and the Supreme Court
in Jamaica. It has special powers in Admiralty matters and exercises jurisdiction in both
rem and personam. A unique feature of the Court is the advice which the judge receives
from some form of Nautical Assessors, (in the UK, usually the Elder Brethren of Trinity
House). In view of the fact that collision actions are matters within the jurisdiction of the
Court, it will be necessary to consider what is the jurisdiction of the Court, and examine
the remedies available to a claimant - arrest and Mareva Injunction.

The statutory jurisdictional basis of the maritime claims is to be found in Section 20(2) of
the UK Supreme Court Act 1981. Jamaica received her basis for maritime claims via
reception of the UK Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, which had been revised by Parliament
over the years. Among these claims is one concerned with collision, mainly for damage
received or done to a ship. A liberal4 approach is adopted in interpreting the list, which is
regarded as exhaustive5.

The word ‘jurisdiction’ has a number of different meanings, and in this sense may mean
the power of the court to hear and determining proceedings, or it may mean the territorial
venue or reach of the court in certain circumstances. In a maritime matter, the Admiralty
court has the power to hear matters brought in rem or in personam.

4
5

Per Lord Wilberforce in The 'Sandrina' [1985] 1 Ll. Re. 181, 183
Inter alia, the following actions MUST be brought in the Admiralty Court
Actions to enforce claims for loss of life, damage or personal injury arising out of
a collision between ships.

7

An action in personam is against the defendant personally. An action in rem is an action
brought against the res or ‘the thing’. To be more precise, an action in rem is a claim
brought against the thing in which an individual who has done wrong has an interest.
Thus, some intangibles are given legal personality, and as such, ships and companies
are two examples. In The Henrich Bjorn6, Lord Watson stated in his judgement that an
action in rem is an action or proceeding against a ship or other chattel in order to satisfy
some pecuniary claim by the plaintiff. It may seem that an action in rem is merely an
alternative way of proceeding against a defendant, and that therefore actions in rem and
in personam are essentially the same. In response to this, Moulton L.J.7 stated that an
“…action in rem is an action against the ship itself. It is an action in which the owners may
take part, if they think it is proper, in defence of their property, but whether or not they will
do so is a matter for them to decide, and if they do not decide to make themselves parties
to the suit in order to defend their property, no personal liability can be established
against them in that action. It is perfectly true that the action affects them indirectly. So it
would if it were an action against a person who they had indemnified.“ Where the
defendant does not appear in such an action, judgement will then be enforceable only
against the property or res. Where the defendant enters an appearance, he submits to
the jurisdiction of the court personally, and from there on the action continues as an
action both in rem and in personam. The danger here is that if the judgement cannot be
fully satisfied by the res, execution proceedings can be initiated against the defendant
personally.

The distinction between these two classes of maritime claim has a historical genesis,
whereby a maritime lien existed in every case wherein the Admiralty court in the UK has
jurisdiction against the res. However, since the jurisdiction of the admiralty court has been

-

Actions to enforce claims for damage, loss of life or personal injury arising out of
the non-compliance with the Collision Regulations by a ship.
6
(1886) L.R. 11 P.C. 220, 276, 277
7
The Burns [1907] P. 137

8

extended a number of times, at present not all claims enjoy a lien, and therefore in not all
matters can proceedings be taken against the res. One of the great advantages with an
action in rem is that it is attached to the property regardless of who is the owner, so the
vessel cannot escape prosecution merely because it has changes hands.

2.2

CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS

Where parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, the latter may have to decide
on the applicable law to the dispute with a foreign element. It may have a choice between
its own law – lex fori, the law of the flag ship – lex patriae, or the law of the country in
whose waters the event has taken place – lex loci. The traditional standpoint under the
law is that the act or omission must be actionable in the jurisdiction, and must not be
justifiable under the law of the flag state. However, the situation is different for collision
cases. This is because the collision regulations have created a general maritime law
which is applicable by the forum. The status of the High Seas also gives some impetus to
the application of the laws of the flag state.

The original concept of conflict of laws in any collision case was that if the ship was within
the jurisdiction of a particular territory at the time of the collision, then that territory was to
exercise jurisdiction over the vessel. A conflict of laws situations arises here, however.
The difficulty is that if the collision occurs in Country A with a vessel flying the flag of
country B which is manned by nationals of country C, all three countries may be said to
have a valid interest in the vessel. Yet another example is what is the situation where a
collision takes place in the territorial seas of Country A, but occurs between the vessels
flying the flags of countries B and C. Presumptive jurisdiction lies in Country A, but what
of Countries B and C? They too have a right to exercise some jurisdiction.

The 1952 Brussels Convention was an effort to state which courts would have
jurisdiction. Not many states became parties to the convention, in part because any

9

convention on jurisdiction will minimise forum shopping, and also because of the difficulty
of enforcement of judgement. The 1977 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
concerning Civil Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Enforcement of Judgements in matters
of Collision states in Article 4:
“Unless the parties otherwise agree, when a collision occurs in the internal waters
or territorial sea of a State, the law of the state shall apply, and when a collision occurs in
the waters beyond the territorial sea, the law of the court seized of the case shall apply,
except that when all the vessels involved are registered or otherwise documented, or if
not registered or otherwise documented, owned in the same State, the law of that State
shall apply, wherever the collision occurs.”

The jurisdiction of a State covers its internal and territorial waters. Collision
occurring in those waters is subject to municipal law. If the municipal law applies the
Collision Regulations, then is immaterial whether one ship is flying the flag of another
state, or if both are foreign-flagged vessels. The Convention will be applicable to nonparties, not as international convention, but as municipal law8.

Where two vessels are involved in a collision on the high seas, the lex fori
applies. The courts will apply the ‘general maritime law’ which consists of local law and
the “International Shipping Rules approved by the IMO” 9. Where the collision takes place
in foreign waters, the rule laid down in Phillips v. Eyre10 will be applicable. In this case, it
was held that to be actionable in English law, a foreign tort must be both actionable in
England, and not justifiable under the lex loci. This rule was also applied in The ‘Mary
Moxham’. Here, an action was brought in the English Courts by the owner of a pier in
Spanish territorial waters, against British owners whose ship had collided with the pier.
The Court of Appeal accepted the defence that the shipowners were not liable under

8

Shipping Act (1998), Jamaica, s. 230
Mankabady, pg. 507
10
(1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1
9

10

Spanish law for the negligence of their servants who were navigating the ship. It was
therefore held that no tort was committed by the shipowners.

Another important point is that of forum non conveniens. A court may strike out a
matter before it on the basis that it has been before an inappropriate forum. One must
distinguish between choice of jurisdiction and choice of law. A court can decide questions
of foreign law. The fact that it possesses jurisdiction does not mean that it is compelled to
exercise it. There might be another forum in which the case might be tried bore suitably
for the interests of all the parties, and in the interests of justice. The doctrine of forum non
conveniens could be used to decline jurisdiction in appropriate cases. The forum would
thus be able to exercise some amount of discretion. As was stated by the House of Lords
in the leading case on forum non conveniens, The Spiliada11, “the basic principle is that a
stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the court is
satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is
the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more
suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.” The considerations
taken into account by the court when deciding whether or not to exercise jurisdiction are

1)

whether access to sources of proof is relatively easy;

2)

the availability and costs of obtaining witnesses;

3)

the question of the ease of enforceability of any possible judgements; and

4)

any other matters which would have an influence on the expenses or the
ease and speed of holding a trial.

This list is not exhaustive, however, and will vary depending upon the facts of each case.

Another case on the issue is The Abidin Daver12, which has the position of having
a judgement written by 2 authorities on Maritime law, Diplock and Branson. This case
11
12

[1987] 1 Ll. Rep. 1
[1984] 1 Ll. Rep. 339, 2 W.L.R. 196

11

concerned a collision in the Bosphorus (Turkish territorial waters) between a Turkish
vessel and a Cuban vessel. The Turks arrested the Cuban vessel in Turkey, and
instituted legal proceedings there. The Cubans arrested the sister ship of the Turkish
vessel in a UK port. The problem here is that there were now two concurrent actions in
two separate jurisdictions out of the same incident (Turkey and the UK). The trial judge
stayed the English proceedings, but this was overturned by the Court of Appeal. The
House of Lords finally restored the decision of the trial judge. The House of Lords used a
formula which came from The MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Limited13, and framed the
two basic prerequisites for granting the stay of a tort action. One was that there should be
an alternative forum which was either the natural one, and so had a connection with the
facts, or was one where there would be considerably less expense and inconvenience
than in the one where the stay was being sought. The other was that there must be
neither a personal or juridical advantage accruing to the plaintiff in the action which he
stood to lose if the stay was granted. Once both of these are established, then the stay
should be granted. However, there should also be a balancing of interests of the plaintiff
and the defendant – a ‘critical equation’14. The court should involve itself in a balancing
up of the factors which support either side of the case for and against a stay.

An example of a more recent case on forum non conveniens is the case of The
Lakhta15, where there was a dispute as to ownership of the vessel between Latvian
plaintiffs and Russian defendants. A Russian arbitration award decided that the vessel
was owned by the defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiffs arrested the ‘Lakhta’ in
England, claiming a declaration that they were the sole owners of the vessel. The
defendants applied for an order staying the proceedings on the basis of forum non
conveniens. It was held that the stay would be granted, because this case was in every
respect connected with the Baltic states, and it had no connection with England. Also, all

13

[1978] A. C. 795
as per Lord Wilberforce in The Atlantic Star [1973] 2 Ll. Rep. 197, HL
15
[1992] 2 Ll. Rep. 269
14
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witnesses would have to be come from these states, and all documents translated into
English. All these factors indicated that a Russian forum would clearly and distinctly be
more appropriate than an English court. The English action was therefore stayed.

2.3

ARREST

Since 1854, the Admiralty court had the power under the UK Merchant Shipping
Act to order the arrest of any vessel for any injury which “had been caused in any part of
the world to any property of the Crown or the Crown’s subjects by any foreign ship if at
any time it was found in any poet or river of the United Kingdom or within three miles
thereof.” 16 The Brussels Convention on the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, 1954 allows the
arrest of seagoing vessels only in respect of the maritime claims stipulated in it. The
convention deals with two separate kinds of jurisdiction17: Jurisdiction to arrest a ship or
release it upon the provision of bail sufficient to satisfy a judgement for the claim; and
jurisdiction to determine the claim on its merits, and to order judicial sale of the vessel if
so determined. Thus, a plaintiff who has instituted an action in rem against a ship to
enforce a lien is entitled to ask for the arrest of the ship in the same action, even after he
has obtained judgement, provided that no bail has been put up for the ship. Arrests can
be said to be an ‘incident’ in the proceedings in rem.

The arrest is a matter for the discretion of the court. It does not matter if the
ownership of the vessel has changed between the time when a maritime lien attached to
the ship and when it is arrested. However for some claims it is necessary to show an in
personam link between the property and the defendant in the action.

It is possible to arrest, if not the ship involved in the incident which gave rise to the
claim, then its ‘sister ship’. This is based upon whether the vessel in question is owned as
16
17

Mankabady, pg. 509
The ‘Halcyon Isle’, [1980] 2 Ll. Rep. 325, 332
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respects all its shares by the person who would be liable on the claim. The original
position in the law was that there was to be a common ownership link between the
offending vessel and the alternative vessel selected for arrest.18 This was interpreted in a
very restrictive manner, and placed a practical bar to arrest, particularly where a demise
charterer was involved. Thus, in The Eschersheim19, Lord Diplock stated that both
vessels had to be under the same beneficial ownership as respects all their shares. This
gave rise to a spate of cases, wherein it was discussed whether or not the words
‘beneficial owner’ could include the demise charterer. In The Andrea Ursula20, Brandon J.
found that the demise charterer would fall under the in rem action. It was also stated by
Glenn. J. in The Aventicum21 that the court should in all cases look behind the registered
owner to determine the true beneficial ownership. It must be noted that a ship beneficially
owned by a demise charterer is not a ‘sister ship’, per se, but is still liable under the law
as it now stands.

Once the arrested ship is released on bail, she cannot be re-arrested for the same
offence. As per Dr. Lushington in The Kalamazoo: “the bail represents the ship, and when
the ship is released on bail, she is altogether released from that action” 22. However, if the
first arrest is treated as a nullity, and set aside, then the vessel can be re-arrested for the
same action.

18

Hill, pg. 131
[1976] 2 Ll. Rep. 1, 6.
20
[1971] 1 Ll. Rep. 145
21
[1978] 1 Ll. Rep. 84: See also The ‘Maritime Trader’ [1981] 1 Ll. Rep. 153
22
15 Jur. 885, 886
19
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2.4

MAREVA INJUNCTION

An alternative remedy to the arrest of a ship is the Mareva injunction. This is an in
personam order, which prevents (by means of injunction) the defendant from removing his
assets from the jurisdiction, particularly (but not exclusively) where he is not “domiciled,
resident or present” in the jurisdiction23. The purpose of the remedy is not to punish the
defendant, nor is it to secure property for the Plaintiff. Rather, it is to prevent the Plaintiff
from being cheated out of the proceeds of his actions should his claim be successful. It
was used for the first time in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis24, where the charterers
failed to pay their hire. Although they had disappeared, and were now untraceable, there
was evidence that they had a substantial sum in a bank within the jurisdiction. An
injunction was granted restraining the charterers from disposing of or removing any of the
assets within the jurisdiction. This case was followed by the case from which the
injunction received its name: Mareva Compania Naveria S.A. v. International Bulk
Carriers, S.A.25. The order may have very wide terms, and may restrain the defendant
from removing any of his assets from the jurisdiction. This may include a specified asset,
provided that the assets do not exceed the plaintiff’s claim in value. The order may be
varied where necessary to allow the defendant to pay his debts and meet his ordinary
living expenses.

Because the Mareva injunction is such a harsh remedy, the courts are very
careful about their use of it, and have to this end laid down some ground rules. In
Searose v. Seatrain,26 Goff J. noted that if these principles are not observed, a weapon
which was forged to prevent abuse may become an instrument of oppression. Thus, an
order for Mareva injunction should not be sought in terms wider than are reasonably
required for the case. Secondly, any asset to be restrained should be identified with as
23

Mankabady, pg. 519
[1975] 2 Ll. Rep. 137; 1 W.L.R. 1903
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[1975] 2 Ll. Rep. 509
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much precision as possible. Where the asset has not been identified precisely, the
applicant may be required to give an undertaking to pay reasonable costs to a third party
who has to ascertain whether the asset is actually under his control.

26

[1981] 1 Ll. Rep. 556
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3.

CIVIL LIABILITY

3.1

GENERAL

Liability may be based on fault where the wrongdoer intends to cause harm to
others, or where his conduct falls well below a certain standard which is considered
blameworthy. In both cases, the wrongdoer will be liable for the damage caused. The
liability may be strict when it is concerned with damage irrespective of fault. The intention
can only be inferred by conduct.

In incidents of collision, the basic principle is that the liability of the Master and the
Shipowner is based on fault27, but in a few cases, the liability is strict. Examples of such
cases are contravention of a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) and personal injury. In
collision cases, the word usually used to define liability is 'fault'28. This is used to cover
negligence, contributory negligence or breach of a statutory duty by an action or
omission29. It must be pointed out, that the mere presence of a fault will not necessarily
make it actionable in law. The fault in question must have contributed in some way to the
loss or damage30. Thus, there must be present three elements for liability to occur, which
will be discussed further. These are Fault, Damage and Causation.

27

Collision Regulations, Rule 2(a)
This definition of fault given in the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, s. 4
29
See The 'Arya Rokh' [1980] 1 Ll. Rep. 68, where the collision was caused by indecision (omission)
and wrong action.
30
There must be the existence of causative potency.
28
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3.2

FAULT

Fault may be described as an "omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs
would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do"31. It
therefore involves both Causative potency and blameworthiness or any navigational
shortcomings. Thus, one should at all times be exercising a degree of skill and care which
are ordinarily to be found in a competent seaman. If that degree is not met, then fault may
be inferred.

The court may consider the actions taken by both vessels at an early stage even
before the encounter led to the collision. In The 'Auriga'32, Brandon, J. said that there in
"many cases in which a collision occurs between ships in a crossing situation, it is
sufficient in order to assess responsibility for the collision, to consider only the faults of
either ship after the crossing situation came into being. In the present case, however, I do
not think it is sufficient to consider only the faults committed at that stage. On the
contrary, I think it is necessary to go back to an earlier stage, and to consider how the
crossing situation, which did not exist originally, and which led to all the trouble, came to
be created at all." In fact, an error of judgement may not amount to fault at all. In The
33

'Toluca' , Sheen, J. remarked that although the action taken by the captain was not in
hindsight the best possible action, he was still at the time in question exercising
reasonable skill and care. Similar decisions have been held in the cases of The 'Avance'34
and The 'City of Leeds'35.

31

Per Alderson, B in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex. 781
[1977] 1 Ll. Rep. 384, 395
33
[1981] 2 Ll. Rep. 548, 554
34
[1979] 1 Ll. Rep. 143
35
[1978] 2 Ll. Rep. 346
32
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However, a serious error of judgement may amount to fault. In The 'Marimar'36 the
court indicated that in a situation where one vessel was far less equipped than the other,
the risks taken would be far more serious than in another better-equipped ship. The court
decided that the navigational decisions of the ship indicated a misjudgement serious
enough to amount to fault.

It is also possible to have fault arising without a collision. Fault can cause damage
without a collision actually taking place. For example, a vessel may sustain damage as a
result of the excessive swell raised by another ship. Thus, in The 'Maid of Kent'37 a Trinity
House pilot was killed while boarding another ship as a result of the wash from the 'Maid
of Kent'. The Court of Appeal held that the ship should have realised that if she passed
another vessel at the distance and speed which she had, any subsequent wash could
prove a danger to other smaller vessels.

It is also possible to have the faults of both vessels mixed in such a way that both
vessels shall be liable. In fact, this is the usual case in collision cases, particularly where
a breach of the collision regulations is involved.

3.2.1

Elements of Fault

Fault describes some human action or inaction which results in an undesired
event38. Legally, the Master owes a duty to any person on board his ship, and to other
users of the sea to minimise or negate the risk of collision with his vessel. The Master is
entitled to presume that all other users of the seaways will do the same. However, the
fault of one vessel does not excuse the fault of another. Fault exists where 2 elements
exist: A duty of care, and a breach of such duty.

36

[1968] 2 Ll. Rep. 165
[1973] 1Ll. Rep. 49; on Appeal, [1974] 1 Ll. Rep. 434
38
The Law of Collision at Sea, S. Mankabady, 275
37
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3.2.2

Duty of care

It is the duty of the master to act with proper skill and care. This duty may derive
from the common law, or may be imposed by statute.

The common law of good seamanship.

The common law imposes on all persons a duty of care. In Donoghue v.
Stephenson39 Lord Atkin formulated the principle that "you must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
neighbour"40. The 'neighbour' here has been defined as the person or persons in law who
are closely and directly affected by one's actions41. This 'Neighbour Principle' has been
expounded in all areas of law, and Maritime law is no exception. The common law
imposes upon the master several duties arising from the concept of good seamanship.
Thus, the Master is responsible for appraisal, planning and monitoring. It is the duty of the
master to plan sufficiently for the voyage42. This includes the acquisition of charts, as well
as obtaining details of the weather, currents, tides, and draft of the ship at various points
of the intended passage. All navigational marks must be anticipated as well as traffic
separation schemes and radio aides. Furthermore the Master and crew must ensure that
steps are taken to ensure that all the navigation is planned with contingency plans, and
that the bridge organisation provides for briefing of all concerned with navigation of the
ship. There is also the need for information from other ports re traffic, as well as
continuous monitoring of position, and cross-checking of human decisions to minimise

39

[1932] A. C. 562
ibid., pg. 580
41
See also Anns v. Merton London Borough [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024
42
See for example the UK M. Notice 854. Also, see the Code of Good Management in Safe Ship
Operation issued under the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), and the International Shipping
Federation (ISF), where it is stated "Safety and efficiency are integral to good management."
40
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human error. Mr. Justice Sheen in The 'Roseline'43 summarised all the duties of the
masters and owners of a vessel as follows:
" It is the duty of the owners to make sure that their Masters understand their
duties and understand that they are expected to run an efficient ship. The other officers
must be of adequate qualification and experience to enable the Master to carry out his
duties.

In a well run ship the following precautions will be taken when navigating in
reduced visibility:
1.

The ship will be navigated at a safe speed, and in addition the engine room
telegraph will be on 'stand-by' and the engine room will be manned for immediate
response to orders unless the engines are operated by direct control from the
bridge.

2.

Navigation lights will be exhibited.

3.

The appropriate sound signals will be sounded and, whenever possible, they will
be sounded automatically.

4.

An efficient radar watch will be maintained. An efficient watch includes long range
scanning at regular intervals.

5.

A lookout will be posted in a position where he can maintain good aural look out.

6.

In waters in which safe navigation of the ship requires frequent and accurate fixing
of her position and alterations of course, there will be on the bridge two competent
officers, one of whom will be Master or a senior officer. This will enable one officer
to concentrate on plotting the position of the ship while the other keeps radar
watch."

43

[1981] 2 Ll. Rep. 410, 411

21

Statutory Duties

Where a statutory duty is imposed on the Master or a member of the crew and
that duty is broken, they are liable. In fact, some common law duties have been replaced
by statute law in order to resolve some difficulty in the existing law. The US Pennsylvania
Rule44 was meant to apply to statutory fault. The actual nature of the liability and whether
or not a remedy exists under the law will be outlined by the statute.

In a collision scenario, an example of a statutory duty is the requirement to
proceed or attempt to proceed to sea with the required navigational equipment
installations. Regulation 12 chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, 74/78 (SOLAS) requires that ships must carry certain types of equipment, such as
a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass and an echo sounder. These requirements have
been incorporated in some form in national legislation of member states45. Another
example is s. 233 of the Jamaica Shipping Act, which requires a Master to render
assistance to a ship with which he has collided, once he is in a position to do so. Very
specific circumstances exist wherein a Master may omit to perform this duty46. If he fails to
render such assistance in circumstances other than those outlined, the he shall be guilty
of an offence, and upon conviction will be liable to pay a fine or imprisonment, or to both
such fine and imprisonment47.

Standard of Care

The standard of care is that which can reasonably be demanded in the
circumstances. Asquith, L.J. has summarised it by saying that it is necessary to balance

44
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47
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45
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the risk against the consequences of not taking one48. In Glasgow Corporation v. Muir49,
Lord McMillian expressed that the standard of foresight of the reasonable man would be
determined independently of the 'personal equation'. The Court would not be looking for
extremes of nervousness nor overconfidence, but rather a reasonable man who is free
from both over-confidence and over-apprehension. As Lord Reid put it, "a reasonable
man does not mean a paragon of circumspection"50. Rather, the reasonable man "is also
cool and collected, and remembers to take precautions for his own safety, even in an
emergency"51. Thus, as per Brandon J. in The Boneslaw Chrosbry52, " the standard of
care to be applied by the court is that of the ordinary mariner, and not the extraordinary
one, and seamen under criticism should be judged by reference to the situation as it
reasonably appears to them at the time, and not with hindsight."

Thus, the standard for deciding whether there has been a breach of duty is
objective. Too high a degree of skill is not demanded. A mariner must exercise such care
as accords with the standards of a reasonably competent mariner at the time of the
incident. Some of the considerations which must be balanced in order to establish the
objectiveness of the test are the magnitude of the risk, the seriousness of the damage,
the importance of the object to be attained, and the practicality of precautions.

3.2.3

Breach of Duty

In an action for breach of duty, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a duty
is in fact owed to him. Once that is done, he must then prove the existence of the link of
causation between the breach of the duty, and the damage caused. Whereas the Master
or crew are usually the persons guilty of fault, the ship owner may also be liable because

48
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ha may negligently allow his ship to navigate in a defective state. Where the cause of the
collision is the condition of the vessel, the ship owner is liable.

The 1911 UK Maritime Conventions Act abolished the statutory presumption of
fault of a vessel infringing the Collision Regulations, because it was pointed out that the
infringement of the Collision Regulations may not have caused the collision53. Thus, the
breach of the statutory duty may not be the cause of the collision. In the US, however, the
Pennsylvania Rule, which was derived from The Pennsylvania54 case, was the law until
the 1970's. This rule stated that where a rule of statutory fault was violated, there was an
automatic presumption of negligence. One therefore had to prove that the casualty which
occurred was not in violation of a statute which was designed to prevent it55. In The
Hellenic Carrier56 the Court found that Hellenic Lines had met its burden of proof under
the Pennsylvania rule by showing that the absence of fog signals could not have
contributed to the collision.

3.2.4

Inevitable Accident and Agony of the Moment

Inevitable accident is where two vessels are involved in a collision; the liability
may fall on one vessel alone, or on the two vessels. In the latter case, the court will have
to apportion the blame. Alternatively, both vessels are free from blame and will have to
stand their own costs.

A vessel can escape liability in a few circumstances, for example where the
accident is inevitable. Thus, where the vessels are taking all the proper precautions and
53
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are obeying the Collision regulations, and collide in fog, this COULD be considered to be
an inevitable accident. Inevitable accident describes a situation where the collision was
not intended, and could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and
skill. In order to succeed in this plea, three elements must be proven:
1)

That the accident was caused by an Act of God, or 'force majeure';

2)

That all reasonable precautions have been taken, and

3)

There was no fault involved in getting into the situation where the
collision was inevitable.

It is not sufficient to show that the accident was unavoidable at the moment of, or
some moments before its occurrence. Rather, it is necessary to show that all precautions
have been taken, and there was no fault in getting into such a position. In The Alletta57
the plea of inevitable accident failed. In this case, a collision occurred at night between
the vessel 'The England' and the smaller vessel, 'The Alletta', as a result of 'The Alletta'
proceeding right across the main channel of the river to anchor. In so doing, she crossed
the path of 'The England' which struck her on her starboard side. The master of 'The
Alletta' performed all the necessary emergency procedures, but in spite of his actions the
vessel sank. Not before, however, she had collided with a number of dumb barges,
damaging both the vessels and their cargo. She also collided with another moored vessel,
the 'Mare Librum'. A number of actions were brought against the vessels involved. On the
issue of whether or not the collision with the barges was an inevitable consequence of the
first collision, Hewton J. held that 'The Alletta's' movements after the first collision were
proper and seamanlike. Secondly, the collision with the barges was as a direct
consequence of the first collision.
Further, Sheen J. stated in The Vysotsk58 that "…liability for this collision must be
judged from a starting point when the vessels were four miles distant from each other and
ready to pass safely if each maintained her course."
57
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The inevitable accident defence is usually used when a vessel has been caught in
a storm and driven against another vessel or a shore structure. It must be shown that not
only could the force nit have been anticipated, but also that the vessel had been properly
moored and that there was no negligence on the part of those in charge of her.

Another situation which is frequently cited is that of failure of machinery. Here, the
defendant must prove that the defect was latent, and therefore could not be discovered
by reasonable diligence or inspection. He must also prove that the collision was caused
by the defect, and could not be corrected by navigation after the trouble developed.

Where the cause of the collision could not be determined, the plea of inevitable
accident cannot be relied upon. In The Merchant Prince59 a vessel collided with an
anchored vessel as a result of the failure of her steering gear. The cause of the failure,
and its latency, could not be established, and so the Court of Appeal held that so long as
the cause of the accident was unknown, then the defendants were unable to claim that it
was inevitable or unavoidable.

In a contrary situation, in the case of Gleehong Harbour Trust Commissioners v.
Gibbs Bright & Co. (The Octavian)60, the vessel was properly moored, when she was
driven off her moorings by a sudden strong squall. She subsequently collided with a
beacon owned by the Harbour. The latter claimed damages, but the defendants denied
liability on the grounds of Act of God or inevitable accident. The High Court of Australia
accepted this defence.

Where a vessel, without any fault, is placed in a position of great danger, she is
not liable if the action which her crew takes to mitigate the emergency proves to be
59
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wrong. In The Rywell Castle61 James C.J. stated that "a ship has no right to put another
ship into a situation of extreme peril, and then charge that other vessel with misconduct."

Again, when the Master is placed, through no fault of his own, in a real dilemma,
and has to take one of two courses which both involve risk, he is not guilty of negligence
if he chooses the option which has the least risk.

3.3

DAMAGES

Where fault results in no damages, or is not an effective cause of the damage, or
damage occurs without fault, then no cause of action arises.

3.3.1

Division of damages

At common law, the rule was that where two vessels are at fault, damages would
be equally divided regardless of the degree of fault. This rule found justification in the
idea that it would induce care and vigilance on the part of both parties in the navigation of
their vessels. If the plaintiff's damages have been caused partly by his own negligence,
and partly by the negligence of the defendant, he cannot claim anything. This rule of
contributory negligence caused hardships in certain circumstances. In order to mitigate
this hardship, the Courts introduced the concept of 'last opportunity'62 by which a plaintiff
could recover damages from the person who had the last opportunity to avoid the
incident. However the test used to find out the last opportunity was not clear, and the
situation became worse by the extension of the rule to cases of 'constructive last
opportunity'.
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In 1910 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
with respect to Collisions between Vessels was adopted. It replaced the common law rule
by one which provides for the apportionment of damages according to the degree of
blame. The provisions of this Convention were incorporated into the 1911 UK Maritime
Conventions Act. The Act provides for damages to be apportioned according to the
degree of fault of the vessels involved, and has gone far to mitigating the difficulties
caused by the 'last opportunity' rule. In Boy Andrew v. St. Rognvald (owners)63 the 'St.
Rognvald' was at fault in overtaking too close, and the 'Boy Andrew' was also at fault for
altering course while being overtaken. The question was whether the former was guilty of
contributory negligence. Lord Simon answered in the affirmative, but stated "the
suggested test of last opportunity seems to be inaptly phrased and likely in some cases to
lead to error…'in truth, there is no such rule - the question, as in all cases of liability for a
tortious act, is not who had the last opportunity of avoiding the mischief, but whose action
caused the wrong'." For contributory negligence, all that is required is that the plaintiff
should have failed to take reasonable care for his own safety. The standard of care is in
general the same as that in negligence, and is in the same manner objective and
impersonal. Lord Denning in Jones v. Livox Quarries Ltd.64 Stated that a "person is guilty
of contributory negligence if he ought to have foreseen that if he did not act as a
reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself, and in his reckonings he must take
into account the possibility of others being careless." Consequently, the courts are to
take into account both culpability and causative potency when making such an
evaluation.

In the US, the courts used to apply the major-minor fault. This rule provides that
where the clear fault of one vessel is shown to have been sufficient alone to account for
the disaster, there will be a presumption that the vessel is solely liable, unless rebuttable
by clear and contrary proof of contributing fault. That rule was implicitly repudiated by the
63
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Supreme Court in United States v. Reliable Transport Co. Inc.65, where the court
discarded the 'equally divided damages' rule in favour of a 'comparative negligence' rule.
This rule provides that where two ore more parties have contributed by their fault to
cause property damage in a maritime collision, liability for such damage is to be allocated
among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault. Under this rule,
it is fault, and not the degree of causation on which the liability is apportioned. The 'majorminor fault' presumption is no longer good law in the US66.

3.3.2

Apportionment

The court must also apportion the fault between the vessels involved in the
collision, and this is not an easy matter. In The Sea Star67, Brandon J. found that the
situation of danger was caused by the 'Sea Star', but that the other vessel was also at
fault in her failure to post a proper look out, and in not responding to the incident in a
prudent manner. Thus, although the 'Sea Star' was held 75% to blame, the other vessel
had to stand 25% of the loss, as damages are calculated proportionate to the degree of
fault.
Similar factual scenarios took place in the State of Himachal Pradesh68. Here the
court explained the situation where part of the blameworthiness was in an 'agony of the
moment' situation. In considering the blameworthiness of that failure, the Court took into
account the actions of the Master of the vessel, who was taking into account the fact that
his vessel, while large, has little manoeuvrability, and also had little water under her. He
was reluctant to reduce speed, or reverse his engines as a result of the effective control
he would loose. On the evaluation of the court, the vessel was only 15% to blame for the
collision, and damages would be apportioned accordingly. In the US, the courts apply the
65

[1975] AMC 541
See Neptune Maritime v. Essi Camilla [1984] AMC 2983
67
[1976] 1 Ll. Rep. 511; CA (dismissed) [1976] 2 Ll. Rep. 477
68
[1985] 1 Ll. Rep. 341
66

29

comparative negligence standard set out in United States v. Reliable Transport Co.69.
This standard provides that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to
cause property damage in a maritime collision, liability for such damage is to be allocated
among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault. Under this
standard, it is the culpability, bot the degree of causation on which liability is apportioned.

Where it is impossible to apportion degrees of fault, the court must apportion the
blame in equal degrees. In The Sedulity70 Willmer J. explained the meaning of the words
'equally to blame' by stating that one "…(should) not read those words a meaning that
both tortfeasors must necessarily be found to blame in equal degrees…both tortfeasors
(must be) in equal case in the sense that the faults of each must be held to be
contributory in some degree." Winn L. J. refers to this in the Lucille Bloomfield71 where
he said: "When I look again at Section (1) of the Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, I
observe… a perfectly clear indication that the primary tasks of the court is to apportion
liability according to fault. This is followed by the proviso that if the court finds it is not
possible to apportion different degrees of fault, the court is to declare an equal distribution
of fault. It is therefore… a condition precedent to a declaration that liability be apportioned
equally that the court has found it impossible to establish different degrees of fault."

Usually, the courts apportion the liability for the damage or loss by deciding
separately, in reference to each vessel, what was the degree in which the fault of one
caused the damage or loss. This process involves comparison and it requires an
assessment of the interrelationship of the respective faults of each vessel. In The 'Golden
Mistral'72, Sheen J. found that although the 'Golden Mistral' was not exhibiting an anchor
light at the time of the collision, the other vessel should have seen her much earlier than
she was seen.
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Blame for a collision is, however, not to be apportioned by counting or 'totting up'73
the number of faults. The court has to consider qualitatively the navigational faults, and
their interplay in contributing to the collision. As per Lord Denning in The ‘Koningin
Juliana’74, the "degree of fault is not to be measured by counting the number of faults on
each side. It is to be measured by assessing both their blameworthiness and their
causative effect."

Apportionment of blame has a number of difficulties inherent in it. Firstly, it must
be said that the trial judge who has the benefit of hearing the evidence for the first time is
at an advantage to the appellate judge. In fact, since apportionment usually involves
serious questions of fact, and almost none of law, then it is usually only in exceptional
circumstances that the appeal tribunal will revise the apportionment decisions of the trial
judge. It is commonplace that courts attribute greater blame to the ship which creates the
position of difficulty. However, many courts find it difficult to assess the causative potency
in terms of percentage. As per Lord Wright in The McGregor75: "(Apportionment) is a
question of the degree of fault, depending on a trained and expert judgement considering
all the circumstances, and it is different in essence from a mere finding of fact in the
ordinary sense. It is a question, not of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but of
proportion, balance and relative emphasis, and of weighting different considerations. It
involves an individual choice of discretion, as to which there may well be differences of
opinion by different minds." As has been indicated before, where it is impossible to say
that there is any clear preponderance of blame on either side then liability must be
apportioned equally.
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A more positive fault is not necessarily more blameworthy than negligent
navigation. But, the fact that it may be so is apparent from comparing extreme cases - for
example grossly negligent navigation as opposed to deliberate running down. The court is
free to attach blame where it sees fit, but as Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated in The
Savinia76, whether the court should attach more blame to a deliberate breach of a rule as
opposed to a fault or omission "…depends on all the circumstances, and in particular, the
nature of the rule and the mode of its breach, on the one hand, and the degree of
negligence in navigation on the other."

An interesting concept is the right of recovery against two negligent vessels.
When an innocent vessel suffers damage through the combined negligence of two other
vessels, the whole damage may be recovered from either wrongdoer. The rule is that
where the separate tort of two independent actors cause damage, the Plaintiff may
recover in full from either of them77. Where one vessel is made to pay the entire damage
resulting from a collision for which another vessel was similarly to blame, the former may
recover a contribution form the other. In The Cairnbahn78, the vessel collided with a barge
being towed by a second vessel. The barge owners sued both vessels which were held
equally to blame. The barge owners proceeded successfully against one 'The Cairnbahn',
which in turn claimed to recover from the other defendant half of the money. It was held
that they were entitled to do so, because the damages which she had paid were part of
the damages caused by the combined acts of the vessels.

3.3.3

Remoteness

Remoteness of damage is concerned with the question of whether damages may
be recovered for particular items of the plaintiff's loss. Measure of damages, on the other
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hand, refers to the calculation of the amount of pecuniary compensation which the
defendant must pay in respect of those items of the plaintiff's loss which are not too
remote. The rule in respect of remoteness of damage is the defendant is not responsible
for all the consequences of his wrongful act or omission. Damages which the court
considers to be too remote cannot be recovered. Several decisions have in fact referred
to the direct, immediate or last cause. In Re Polemis79, Scrutton J. stated that damage is
indirect if it is "due to the operation of independent causes having no connection with the
negligent act, except that they could not avoid the results." In this case, a ship was hired
under a charter which excepted both the ship owner and charterers from liability for fire.
Among other cargo, there was a large amount of flammable material in tins. During the
voyage, the tins leaked, filling the hold with vapour. Upon unloading, due to the negligent
actions of the servants of the charterers, a spark was created, and flames engulfed the
ship which was totally destroyed. The charterers were here held liable, because the
damage was deemed to be direct. However, in The Wagon Mound80 the Privy Council
(PC) expressed its disapproval with the principle of Re Polemis and refused to follow it.
The PC held that a plaintiff can recover damages for the negligence of a defendant only if
that damage could not be foreseen by a reasonable man, It is not enough that the
damage was a direct physical consequence of the negligent act. The PC laid much stress
upon the difficulties of the directness test, which they felt was unfair. "It does not seem
consonant with current ideas of justice or morality that for an act of negligence, however
slight or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable damage, the actor should be
liable for all consequences, however unforeseeable, however grave, so long as they can
81

be said to be 'direct'."

Thus, it is the "foresight of the reasonable man alone that can

determine responsibility." The word 'foreseeable' has a different meaning from 'probably'
or 'likely'. Foreseeability is a relative concept, and as such is not absolute. It must be
noted, however, that foresight as a test of remoteness is heavily qualified by the fact that
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neither the precise extent of the damage nor the precise manner of its inflection need be
foreseeable. It just need be a consequence which the reasonable man would expect to
flow from his actions.

3.4

CAUSATION

Where fault is not an effective cause of damage, or where damage is suffered
without fault, no cause of action arises. Thus, the breach of duty must have cause or
contributed to the collision and so there must be a link, a so-called 'chain' between the
breach and the damage. In The Empire Jamaica82, a collision occurred, and it was
subsequently discovered that the Officer of the watch did not posses a certificate of
competence. The question before the courts was whether the lack of qualification was the
cause of the accident. The evidence showed that the officer was fully competent, and it
was held that there was no causal connection between the lack of certification and the
collision.

Frequently, the court finds a number of faults on each ship such as bad lookout
and excessive speed. Some of these may contribute to the collision, while others may not.
The rule is that only the faults which are the 'proximate' cause are to be taken into
account in the assessment of the blame. The proximate cause is the efficient cause and
not merely an incidental cause which may be nearer in time to the event. Although it is
83
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be more accurate to refer to causation as a 'net'. "Causation is not a chain, but a net. At
each point influences, forces, events, and precedents meet, and the radiation from each
point ends infinitely. At the point where these various influences meet, it is for the
judgement as upon a matter of fact to declare which of the causes thus joined at the point
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of effect was the proximate and which the remote cause." Proximate” here therefore
doesn't mean proximate in time, but rather "proximate in efficiency".

Where there are two concurrent or interacting causes of loss, the efficient or
predominant cause is deemed to be the proximate cause. In The Judith M84, both parties
admitted blame for excessive speed, failing to reduce speed and bad radar look-out. It
was held that although both were negligent, and both actions contributed to the collision,
the actions of the 'Glaciar Azul' were more to blame than the 'Judith M', and so
apportionment was forty percent to the 'Judith M', and sixty percent to the 'Glaciar Azul'.

Where one vessel is at fault for a considerable time apparent to the other, which
could have avoided the collision, the latter may be the only vessel to blame. In Admiralty
Commissioners v. S. S. Volute85, the House of Lords stated that where the defendant's
negligence is subsequent to that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's negligence is still
contributory to the collision if there is not "a sufficient separation of time, place, or
circumstance between the plaintiff's negligence and the defendant's negligence to make
the defendant's the sole cause of the collision". Thus, Lord Shaw has observed that there
is "a period of time during which the causal function of the act or approach operates, and
it is not legitimate to extend that cause backwards into an anterior situation.86" There may
therefore be a break in the chain of causation - A nova causa interveniens. This means
that although the defendant's breach of duty is a cause of the plaintiff's damage,
nevertheless some other intervening event is regarded as the sole cause of that damage.
The intervening event could be a natural one, an act of a third party, or an act of the
plaintiff himself. In The Fogo87 Cairns J. said that the actions of the Plaintiffs in not making
a tug available for the 'Trentbank' is what actually caused her to sink. “That omission was
in fact a nova causa interveniens, and the 'Fogo' was not liable.“ Thus, the chain of
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causation was broken. In contrast, in The ‘Calliope’88 the court found that the subsequent
negligence of the plaintiffs did not break the chain of causation as this would have
resulted in the resurrection of the last opportunity rule based upon the facts at hand.

An example of an intervening natural event was the Carslogie Steamship Co. Ltd.
v. Royal Norwegian Government89 where the Plaintiff’s ship was damaged in a collision
for which the other ship was wholly responsible. After temporary repairs, the ship went on
a voyage to the US. Such a voyage would not have been made had the collision not
occurred. During the Atlantic crossing, she suffered heavy damage due to bad weather.
The House of Lords held that the heavy weather damage “was not in any way a
consequence of the collision, and must be treated as a supervening natural event
occurring in the course of a normal voyage.”

3.5

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

The concept of limitation of liability of the shipowner has existed in maritime law
for a long time. In fact, European maritime law has long recognised the right of the
shipowner to limit his liability in the case of collision to the value of the ship and any
anticipated freight. This limitation action (which has been termed a kind of ‘statutory
insolvency’) was introduced to the English legal system in 173390. This was through the
Responsibilities of Shipowners’ Act, which had the effect of limiting Shipowners’ liability
th

for theft by the Master or Crew to the value of the ship or freight. It was not until the 19

Century that the concept of limiting liability for collisions began to mitigate the previous
stance of unlimited liability. The basic idea behind limitation was to give encouragement
to shipowners in the pursuit of the Maritime adventure. It has been suggested that if a
shipowner was to gamble all his assets in the adventure, only to be left open to the very
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real possibility that he could be faced with exposure to unlimited liability for occurrences
over which he had no control, his adventurous spirit might be stifled91. Over the years, the
rules on limitation were developed and eventually extended to cover loss of life and
personal injury.

The criteria for fixing the value of limitation has differed over the years, and
depending on the various legal systems different standards were in the past maintained.
For example, in some legal systems, the maximum limitation was by reference to the value
of the vessel and her impending freight. In others it was calculated on the tonnage of the
vessel. This difference of approach was the main reason for the formulation of the 1924
Brussels Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of
Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Vessels. This convention, however, did not solve the
issue, and the provisions were based on compromise. In 1957, the Convention was
revised, and a system which adopted the tonnage of the ship as the limit of liability. This
convention also had its share of problems, and in 1976, a new convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC) was agreed upon. This convention came into effect in
1986, and sets the present basis for liability92. Collision cases are covered by the
convention on the basis of Article 2 (1) which includes damage arising in connection with
the operation of a ship.

In the 1924 convention, in order to limit liability, one merely had to show the
absence of fault on the part of the party who wished to limit his liability. This fault was
described in Lord v. Goodall S.S. Co.93, as “…a personal participation by the owner in
some fault or act of negligence, causing or contributing to the loss, or a condition of things
likely to produce or contribute to the loss, without appropriate means to prevent it.” The
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amount of limitation here was determined by the value of the vessel, the freight and its
accessories, provided that it did not exceed an aggregate sum.

The 1957 convention, however, introduced a limit of liability based upon the
tonnage of the vessel. Thus, a new level of calculating the liability was determined.
However, the basis under which one could limit one’s liability had also changed. The
person should not be guilty of ‘fault or privity’. The latter word in this case means that it is
necessary to prove knowledge on the part of the person94. It must be pointed out,
however, that privity means not only a positive knowledge, but a presumed or
constructive knowledge95. The tests used to describe whether the actual fault or privity
rule comes into play with regard to certain persons (specifically, companies, and what
could be said to be the controlling mind) is twofold. Firstly, who could be said to be ‘in
control’ of the particular situation; and whether or not it is likely that if the person had
performed and carried out his duties properly, the damage or loss would not have
occurred96.

The LLMC set a new amount of limitation. The amount set by the 1957 convention
was adequate at the time, but the situation has changed, and the amount of loss caused
by damage now is not adequately represented by the previous regime. The 1976
Convention has preserved the distinctions outlined in the 1957 convention, but now
apportionment is set on a sliding scale. Thus, there is a different level of limitation for loss
of life or personal injury as opposed to all other claims. Under the LLMC, a limitation fund
is set up which is increased compared to the 1957 convention.

Under article 4 of the convention, a person may loose his right to limit his liability if
‘it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the
intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably
94
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result’. This Article reverses the burden of proof. Under the existing law, the burden of
proof is on the party seeking to limit his liability. However, under Article 4, it is the person
seeking to bar limitation who must prove it. Also, of importance here is that the language
of the 1957 convention (actual fault or privity) does not appear. Under this regime, the
person looses the right to limit his liability here there was intention to cause loss or
recklessness as to the outcome of his actions.
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4.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

A crime is an act or omission which is considered by Parliament to cause harm to
the public. Where Parliament wishes such an act or omission to be considered as a crime,
it is so stated by legislation, and is punishable in a manner related directly to the
seriousness of the offence. Thus, an offence is a transgression of the local law. It
therefore gives the criminal courts jurisdiction over the matter in question, which can be
tried in the local courts, as in section 236 of the Shipping Act 1998 (Jamaica). Not every
breach of a statutory duty creates an offence, but rather, it must be expressly stated, and
depends upon whether or not the duty is mandatory, and if another means exists for its
enforcement. A breach of the Collision Regulations gives rise to a number of criminal
offences, which differ from civil offences in that criminal procedures are applied to deal
with them.

Criminal procedure is beyond the scope of this paper, but for the purposes of
clarification, crimes are classified as summary or indictable offences. Summary offences
are those which are tried by a judge, sitting without a jury, by courts having summary
jurisdiction. On the other hand, indictable offences are brought before the Supreme Court
and are heard by a judge sitting with a jury. The classification of crimes as summary or
indictable reflects the seriousness of the matter, with indictable offences being the more
serious. They therefore have more stringent penal provisions.

40

4.1

ELEMENTS OF A CRIME

A crime consists of two elements: mens rea, which is the mental element, and
actus reus, which is the act itself. A crime exists when both elements coincide97. Mens rea
refers to the moral blameworthiness of the individual. That is, the mental state of the
individual who has committed the act. There are differing standards of mens rea required
for different crimes. Broadly categorised, these may be wilful default, recklessness or
negligence. Wilful default is where an individual, with intent, performs an act or omission
which he knows will have a particular result, and commits the act indifferent to its
outcome. Thus, in the case of Bradshaw v. Ewart-James (The “N.F. Tiger”)98, the
question was whether the master of a ship could be guilty of an offence of contravention
of the collision regulations which occurred after he has left the bridge. The court
determined that the word ‘wilful’ was synonymous with the word ‘conscious’, and in this
case the Master was didn’t consciously or wilfully allow the default to happen.

Recklessness on the other hand in the deliberate taking of an unjustifiable risk.
The element of foreseeability is important here in that the individual foresees that the
event will probably result from his action. Recklessness with respect to circumstances
means realisation that they may exist without either knowing or hoping that they do.

It has been a question of debate whether negligence fits into the discussion of
mens rea, but in this situation negligence could be the central cause of a collision, and as
such it shall be discussed here99. A man acts negligently when he brings about a
consequence which a reasonable or prudent man could have foreseen and avoided. The
nature of negligence is an objective standard, but it does not rule out the possibility of
97
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subjective evaluation. As with everything else, all the fact must be taken into account.
Negligence on the past of the Master is not by itself criminal, but it may be relied upon in
criminal proceedings to establish liability.

The actus reus, on the other hand, covers the actual act, conduct or omission.
The actus reus can only be established by looking at the specific definition of the crime.
Thus, under section 236 of the Shipping Act (Jamaica), a Master is guilty of an offence
where he fails to report an accident100. An offence may also be committed where there is
no 'act’ or ‘omission’, but merely a state of affairs. For example, if the master is drunk, as
log as this ‘state of affairs’ continues, the actus reus of the crime continues. Such an
offence is called a ‘status’ or ‘situation offence’.

4.2

STRICT LIABILITY

In offences of strict liability, it is not necessary for evidence of knowledge to be
adduced. Thus, the defendant’s honest and reasonable beliefs could not afford a
defence. Offences of strict liability are exceptions to the general rule of mens rea. This
element need not be proven, and the justification for this lies in the special nature of the
crimes themselves. These are almost all the creation of statute, and reflect the desire of
Parliament to make certain acts, once committed, criminal. These acts are usually not
criminal in and of themselves, but contrary to the public interests101.

4.3

VICARIOUS LAIBILITY

This concept means that the master is liable for the acts of his servants,
performed in the course of his employment. The phrase ‘course of his employment’
should be interpreted in light of the contract of employment, and all circumstances
100
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connected thereto. This concept, which is well established in tort law, is not applicable in
criminal law. This is because of the general principle that one cannot be liable for the
crimes of another. There are three circumstances in which this may occur. First, the
master may be held liable for the acts of his servant that he has delegated to him.
Secondly, the acts may be performed by the servant, but are in law the master’s acts.
Thirdly, the master and the servant may both be liable.

The officer of the watch is responsible for the safe conduct of the ship in
accordance with his orders. The presence of the master on the bridge does not relieve
the officer of his duties until he has been formally relieved. The master may delegate
some of his duties, but not the responsibility for it, since it would become impossible to
enforce a breach of the regulations if an escape route was via delegation. In the second
scenario, command of the ship is entrusted to the master alone. Thus, he enjoys power
over all persons on board the vessel. Since command rests with the master, then the acts
of other seamen on board the vessel may be regarded as the master’s acts. Thus, there
is a distinction between delegation of matters of seamanship, and delegation in matters of
law. This situation is applicable especially where command is a central feature of the
actus reus102.

4.4

DEFENCES

When one pleads no guilt to a charge, the defence is often based upon mistake,
drunkenness or intoxication, necessity or superior orders.

Mistake will excuse an act where the law requires some element of wilful default
or recklessness relative to some part of the actus reus. The leading case on mistake is
Tolson103, where the defendant, on reasonable grounds believed that her husband had
102
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been drowned at sea. When she married again five years later, the court found that she
had genuinely made an error in believing that her husband was deceased, and she was
not guilty of bigamy. The mistake, whether reasonable or not, will not be accepted as a
defence where the crime is one of strict liability104. Also, mistake or ignorance of the law is
no defence. The limits of this defence were discussed in The Nordic Clansman105 where it
was determined that a reasonable mistake as to fact, such as the ship’s position or
course, was a good defence, but a mistake as to the meaning or scope of words in the
law will not suffice. Intoxication is not a good defence, and rarely works. In fact, it is an
offence to be in charge of the ship while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The
actus reus of this offence is the Master being in command with a particular level of drugs
or alcohol in his system. Necessity is an ambiguous and very subjective defence. If the
Master is faced with limited choices, all of which will either break the criminal law or will
cause harm to himself and others, he may be forced to select the least damaging one on
the spur of the moment, and plead ‘agony of the moment’. This has to be decided on a
case by case basis, and in not all instances will it succeed. It may however have a
mitigating effect upon the penalty imposed for contravention of the law.

4.5

PARTICULAR OFFENCES

An example of a specific offence is the failure to observe the collision regulations.
Section 229 of the Shipping Act, 1998 (Jamaica), requires all owners and masters of
vessels to comply with the collision regulations, and to carry all lights and sounds as are
required by the regulations106. The Act goes on in subsection (2) to state that where
“contravention of the collision regulations is caused by the wilful default of the Master or
owner of a vessel, he shall be guilty of an offence, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars.”

104

in the Tolson case, the minority took the view that the offence of bigamy was one of strict liability.
[1980] 1 Ll. Rep. 31, 36
106
s. 299(1)
105

44

Yet another example of a specific offence is the failure to assist a vessel in
distress. It is the duty of the master to assist vessels in distress and such a duty is
provided for in a number of different international conventions107. Article 11 of the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and
Salvage at Sea, 1910 states that every master, so far as he can do so without serious
danger to his vessel, her crew or her passengers, render assistance to everyone found at
sea in need of such assistance. This was further entrenched in the Maritime Conventions
Act of the UK in 1911, and the same principle exists today in a narrower form in the
Jamaica Shipping Act, 1998 in section 233, where the Master is obligated to render
assistance to any vessel with whom he has collided. The principle exists in its traditional
manner in section 236, and the failure for acting in the required manner is a fine not
exceeding two hundred and fifty thousand dollars (or imprisonment for a term of not more
than 2 years in s. 223).
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5.

COLLISION REGULATIONS

The rules of the road have been developed over centuries of use of the seaways.
A set of practices which seemed to be the most logical way to deal with a particular set of
circumstances became concretised into customary international law. These customary
rules have codified in a number of countries as far back as 1863.108 These regulations
have been modified over the intervening years, and have been replaced by successive
sets. They were first codified Internationally by the Brussels Convention, 1910. They
have been updated and redrafted by the Safety of Life at Sea Conventions and new
regulations were annexed to the Final Draft of the 1960 Conference.

The Collision regulations (COLREGS) are comprised of 38 rules, which are
divided into 5 parts, followed by 4 annexes. Part A deals with the application of the rules,
Part B deals with steering and sailing rules, while Parts C and D deal with lights and
shapes, and sound signals respectively. The exemption provisions are dealt with in Part
E. The Annexes, on the other hand, deal with the details of placement of lights (Annex I),
additional signals for fishing vessels (Annex II), technical details on sound signal
appliances (Annex III) and distress signals (Annex IV).

5.1

INTERPRETATION

The COLREGS are designed for the practical use of mariners. Their primary task
is to “avoid collision or even the risk of collision from happening and their secondary
objective is to set up standards of conduct for navigating officers.” 109 In order to achieve
these objectives, uniform interpretation in needed. This will lead to consistency in action
taken with regards to various maritime Encounters. Thus, the parameters are set so that

108
109

See Mankabady, pg. 47. Order in Council of Jan 9, 1863, London Gazette, Jan. 13.
Mankabady, pg. 71

46

in any number of potential accident situations, the parties will know what to do in order to
minimise and mitigate loss or damage. Thus, the COLREGS take into account a wide
range of different factors and considerations, and “due regard shall be had to all dangers
of navigation… and to any special circumstances, including limitations of the vessels
involved…to avoid immediate danger.110” It is clear that in construing the rules, attention
must be given to the perils of navigation, collisions and their effect upon the marine
environment111. However, nothing in the rules shall excuse the owner, master or crew of
the vessel from complying with the rules112. This rule must however be interpreted in a
liberal fashion. Since the rules are in some cases “loose-textured”, the law of collision has
been judiciously interpreted in a liberal way based upon the facts of each case and the
purpose of the law. When applying the rules and concept of ‘good seamanship’ to
individual cases, judges enjoy a discretion to determine the scope, and therefor mould the
law of collision based upon certain circumstances. This sort of judgement is necessary
because of the difficulties of evidence, and therefore there is some degree of speculation
as to how the collision actually happened. Thus, in The Sea Star113, the CA judge
remarked upon the necessity of sometimes speculating upon how the collision in question
could have taken place. Although not a discretion to be used lightly, in some instances it
may be of great help in making a cloudy issue more clear. A similar thing occurred in The
Adolf Leonhardt114 where the learned judge went further, and then speculated upon what
the ship SHOULD have done.

A number of rules have arisen with respect therefore to the interpretation of the
collision rules and the collisions themselves. Thus, manoeuvrability or limitations on
manoeuvrability are important factors in the interpretation of the rules. However, vessel
size and type of cargo are not usually relevant. Since the rules are instructions to
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mariners, the actions described in them must be taken in ample time to carry out their
purpose. The rules are designed to prevent collisions and imminent risk of collisions as
well. In deciding whether the Master is at fault, it must be borne in mind that where one is
placed into difficulty as a result of the negligent actions of another person, his actions
cannot be judged too harshly. When judging actions, they must be looked at from the
point of view of the person involved at the time, and not with hindsight. It must also be
borne in mind that the rules have been read and interpreted by seamen, therefore they
should be interpreted from the point of view of mariners. In The Koningen Juliana115, Lord
Denning stated that the collision rules “should be interpreted by the courts in the same
way as a seaman would interpret them.” Another point is that in making decisions, it can
be helpful to take note of decisions and opinions of foreign courts116, and make use of
‘travaux preparatoire’. This more so because the COLREGS are based upon international
convention, and a fundamental desire of the law is uniformity of application117.

5.2

THE RULES

5.2.1

Part A

The first rules (1-3) are general, and lay the foundation for the COLREGS.

Rule 1 deals with application of the rules. It states that the rules shall apply to all
vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing
vessels. The word ‘vessel’ is defined in rule 3(a) and includes “every description of water
craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used, or capable of being used, as
a means of transportation on water”. However, this definition does not include a wreck.
The definition also limits the application of the rule to certain geographical areas, which
are the high seas, and all waters connected therewith which are navigable by seagoing
115
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vessels. The High Seas are defined in section 86 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 1982, (UNCLOS) as all parts of the sea that are not included in the
internal waters of a state (here including territorial waters) or in the archipelagic waters of
an archipelagic state. Article 3 of UNCLOS gives every state the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea, up to a limit of 12 miles from the baselines. Navigable by seagoing ships means waters that are used or capable of being used by vessels. A dry-dock
was held to fall within this definition in the case of Rankin v. De Coster118. Nothing in the
rules, however, shall interfere with the right of the lawmakers to create their own regime
within inland waters and territorial sea (subsection (b) ). In order to ensure that there is
uniformity, however, the subsection goes on to state that the local rules should adhere as
closely as possible to the collision rules. Subsections (c), (d) and (e) continue to state that
the local authority has the right to give exemption to ships of special design, or to create
special regimes for certain circumstances, and to create traffic separation schemes.

Rule 2 deals with the responsibility of the Owner, master and crew in applying the
rules. Subsection (a) states that nothing in the rules will exonerate the relevant parties
from complying with the rules “or the neglect of any precaution which may be required by
the ordinary practice of seamen or the circumstances of the case”. The obligation on the
part of these parties is imperative. Not only must they carry out the duties stipulated by
the rules, they must also take precautions required by the ordinary practice of seamen.
Failure to do so will result in fault, which, if it causes damage, will create civil liability in
the offender. If the transgression is a criminal offence, then criminal liability will attach.
There is no rigid test of ‘ordinary practice of seamen’ or ‘good seamanship’. This is a
question of fact to be determined in light of the relevant circumstances119. One view states
that ‘good seamanship’ is a fundamental principle from which all other rules, (including the
collision regulations) spring120. According to another view, good seamanship principally
117
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fills the gaps left in the rules. The rules “…do not contain the whole wisdom of the
sea…” 121, and discretion must be tempered by common sense in a nautical manner. It is
clear that whatever the case, this requirement for ‘good seamanship’ provides for sensible
behaviour. The section also goes on to state in subsection (b) that only where absolutely
necessary may the rules be departed from. If the strict adherence to the rules places a
vessel in a potential collision situation, the Master is allowed to deviate from the rules
under this ‘general prudential’ rule122. The departure from the rules is allowed once four
conditions are fulfilled. It must be absolutely necessary; it must be adopted to avoid
extreme danger; it must only be exercised to the extent that the danger requires; and the
adopted course must be reasonable in the prevailing situation123.

Rule 3 deals with the definitions particular to the convention, and consists of
twelve paragraphs. The use of this paragraph is more to assist mariners to apply the
rules, and spell out the accepted meanings of terms. A few of the more interesting
definitions will be dealt with here. Rule 3(f) defines a vessel “not under command” and
means a vessel which, through some exceptional circumstance, is unable to manoeuvre
in the required manner. A vessel is considered ‘not under command’ if she is unable to
get out of the way of another vessel124 because of faulty steering gear, or by an accident,
for example.

Another interesting definition is the one following this, rule 3(g), which

speaks to vessels “restricted in her ability to manoeuvre”. This differed from paragraph (f)
in that it applies to vessels which are restricted by nature of the work that they are doing.
The list attached to the definition is not exhaustive, but merely an example of the
situations like a dredger, or a tug.

Rule 3(j) deals with a vessel which is “underway”. This situation occurs when a
vessel is no longer constrained by an anchor. Thus, if a vessel is drifting, she is
121
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considered to be “underway”. However, if the vessel is fixed to another object which is
moored or to any fixed object, she is not considered “underway”, as in The Devotion II125.
Another important definition is rule 3(k), which deals with vessels deemed to be “in sight
of” one another. This is when the vessel can be confirmed visually by each other by the
human eye.

5.2.2

Part B

Rule 4 merely defines the application of rules 5 to 10, which comprise section 2.
These rules apply in any condition of visibility, both clear and restricted.

Rule 5 requires that every vessel is to maintain a lookout at all times “by sight and
hearing”, as well as by any other appropriate means. This duty to maintain a lookout is
part of the general practice of seamen, and is also a rule of prudence. Thus, the rule
requires vigilance at all times. “Look-out”, as per Wilmer. L.J., in The Santander”126,
means “an appreciation of what is taking place”. The words “all available means “ in the
definition embraces radar, and other tools, and the intelligent interpretation thereof. The
look out rule does not, however, do away with the need for vigilant watch by “sight and
hearing” when radar is in use127. The person on look out duty must be a competent
seaman of the adequate age and experience. There is no specific place of lookout, but
the person so doing must have an unobstructed view. The usual place is on the bridge.
The person on look out should not leave his post, or have his attention diverted. In many
different cases, bad look out is the overriding cause behind, or at least contributory to,
many accidents which were otherwise avoidable. In The Statue of Liberty128, the collision
occurred on a fine moonlit night with excellent visibility. The only recourse of the court
was to find that the look out was faulty, and contributed in a large way to the collision.
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Rule 6 states that every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed, in order
to take proper and effective action and have enough stoppage room to avoid a collision.
Violation of this rule in conjunction with Rule 5 is the usual cause of collisions. The term
“safe speed” replaces the term previously used of “moderate speed”, and refers to a
speed which would not result in risk to the vessel or to other vessels. Since a vessel can
be travelling quickly, and still be navigating in a safe way, this cannot be determined in
terms of knots. It must rather be evaluated on the basis of the circumstances at the time.
These circumstances are outlined in the section. Thus, one must consider, inter alia, the
state of visibility, the density of traffic, the ease of manoeuvrability, the condition of the
sea and the draft of the vessel129. This was done in The Sanchin Victory130 where Sheen,
J. questioned the Trinity Masters on what a true safe speed would have been for the
vessels involved taking into account the circumstances at the time.

The speed referred to in rule 6 is the speed through the water, and not the engine
speed. If the vessels are travelling at excessive speed, then they may be unable to take
timely action to avoid a collision because of insufficient time to do so at short range. In
The Gilda131, the court found that The Gilda was guilty of excessive speed and bad look
out, and was therefore held two-thirds to blame for the resulting collision. In The
Roseline132, both vessels were at fault for proceeding at excessive speed and allowing a
close-quarters situation to develop. A close-quarters situation is one whose existence
depends on many different circumstances, but has been said to arise when it ‘is no longer
possible for one ship, acting alone, to avoid the other ship by making a substantial
alteration of course.’ Sheen, J. stated in The Talouca133, that “there is no regulation
restricting the speed of the vessel in the channel. The speed of each ship is limited by the
129
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forces of nature created by the movement of the vessel…and by the dictates of prudent
navigation. Each vessel is under an obligation to proceed no faster than the speed at
which it would respond readily to its rudder.”
Figure 1:

Rule 6 (The Sanshin Victory)

It is rare for slow speed to cause a collision, but in some instances, it may be an
imprudent activity to run the vessel at a slow speed. In The Whitehurst and Hoyanger134,
although the vessel’s engines had been stopped and she had not been moving of her
own power, her speed fell to such a level that she was at the mercy of a five-knot current
which carried her into the path of another vessel.

Rule 7 states that every vessel shall use all means necessary to determine the
risk of collisions. This includes the use of radar equipment. The rule continues to state
that such decisions or assumptions cannot be made on the basis of scanty information.
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Emphasis is placed on the words “all available means”, which indicates that the use of
radar to determine the risk may not be necessary. However, when the radar is used, it
must be used in a proper manner to ensure that the risk of collision is minimised. In The
Sedgepool 135 it was said that “(a)n instrument such as radar is supplied to be used, and
…its very possession does impose some additional duty on the vessel fortunate enough
to be equipped with it”. The responsibility inherent with its possession was succinctly
summarised in The Nora136, where Willmer, J. stated “For unto whomsoever such is given,
of him shall much be required. The possession of the radar equipment gives the
‘Westerdam’ a great advantage over other vessels which are not similarly equipped, but it
brings with it…a concurrent duty to see that intelligent and reasonable use is made of the
equipment provided.” In many cases, however, the collision is caused by an excessive
reliance on the radar itself. This leads to a collision which has been ‘radar-assisted’
However, if the radar is properly used, then this equipment can help ascertain whether or
not a collision is at risk or likely to develop. This was the situation in The Linde137, where
the vessels, inter alia, failed to make proper use of the radar. The judge here stated that
both vessels were at fault in respect of their radar, and their look out. The vessels altered
their courses blind, and as a result caused a collision.
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Figure 2: Rule 7 (The Hagen)

Rule 8 deals with action to avoid a collision. It states that any action taken to avoid
a collision shall be “positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance
of good seamanship.” The general words used means that the action or inaction can only
be judged by the concept of good seamanship, and the rule of ordinary care and
prudence. Thus, in The Golden Mistral 138, the court found that each ship had ample
opportunity to see the other, and had plenty of time to make a proper avoiding action.
There was no excuse for not seeing each other until it was too late. This violation of rule
8 by lack of action was the overriding cause of the collision.
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Rule 9 states how a vessel must proceed when travelling through a narrow
passage. The definition of a narrow passage is one which is a question of law, and a
channel shall only be considered as such if the State declares it to be so. It is also to be
published so as to give notice to any mariners using the channel. Under paragraph (a),
vessels are required to keep as near as possible to the starboard outer limit of the
channel or fairway so as not to impede the passage of vessels able to use only the deep
water, or vessels in the process of overtaking. Thus, in The Mersey No. 30139 Wilmer, J.
stated that “each vessel shall keep to her own starboard side of the channel.” In a
number of cases, the collision occurred because either one or the other of the vessels
failed to remain on her side of the channel. In The Adolf Leonhardt140, the collision took
place in clear conditions in the Port of Rotterdam. It was held that the Adolf Leonhardt
was to blame for failing to get to and remain on her side of the channel.

Paragraphs (b) and (c) of this rule deal with sailing and fishing vessels
respectively, and paragraph (d) prohibits vessels from entering narrow channels if they
will impede the passage of other vessels. The rule implies that there may be
circumstances where it will be permissible to cross a narrow channel, notwithstanding that
this impedes a vessel in the channel, providing that such vessel is able to navigate safely
outside the channel. Such circumstances are, however, rare.
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Figure 3:

Rule 9 (The Adolf Leonhardt)

Paragraph (e) deals with vessels overtaking in a narrow channel. It stipulates that
such activity may only take place when the vessels are in sight of one another. There are
no provisions for overtaking in a narrow channel in conditions of restricted visibility.
Paragraph (f) refers to vessels approaching a bend in a narrow channel, and similar to
paragraph (e) has requirements for the use of sound signals. The vessels are required to
proceed with ‘particular alertness and caution’. In The Talouca141, a collision took place
on a bend in the Mae Chow Phraya River. The Trial Judge held that the Master of the
Visahakit I had exercised reasonable skill and care to avoid the collision, and the Talouca
was to blame. On appeal, the court agreed with the trial judge and upheld the decision.
Lord Justice Waller stated that in his opinion, since there is no dispute that the Talouca
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would have had to go to the centre of the bend to turn, she should have reduced her
speed and stood off until both vessels could cross on the straight. The fact that she did
not put the other vessel into an untenable position, and so the Talouca is to blame.
Paragraph (g) deals with anchoring in a narrow channel, which is to be avoided142.

Figure 4: Rule 9 (The Toluca)

Rule 10 applies to traffic separation schemes which have been adopted by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). Since 1898, shipowners operating in the North
Atlantic have adopted recommended routes. Eventually, particularly in high traffic narrow
areas, traffic separation schemes were developed. At first these were recommended to
mariners with a warning, but in 1971 the situation occurred where one ship sank and
142
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became a wreck, and another other ship ploughed into the wreck (although marked) and
also subsequently sank143. This led to the IMO to request from its member states to make
such schemes mandatory, and to prescribe travelling in the wrong direction in such
schemes an offence.

The purpose of ships’ routing is to improve the safety of navigation in converging
areas, and where the volume of traffic is great. This includes, inter alia, traffic separation
schemes, two-way routes and recommended tracks. Traffic separation schemes (TSS)
separate the opposing streams of traffic by appropriate means, including the
establishment of inbound and outbound traffic lanes. A TSS may lie on the high seas.
Where this is the case, it will be binding only on vessels flying the flag of a state party.
But, where a whole or a part of the TSS lies within Territorial waters, all vessels must
obey it. This is because the coastal state exercises its territorial rights on all vessels using
the waterway, not only those flying its flag. It must be pointed out that where a TSS lies
partly on the high seas and partly in the territorial waters of a State, the situation could be
complicated, and agreement with the coastal state is necessary to enforce the scheme.
According to paragraph (a) Rule 10 only applies to a TSS which has been adopted by the
IMO. All vessels using the scheme must conform to the essential principles of routing. If
they are following the traffic flow, they must proceed in the correct lane, and if they are
crossing, they must do so as near to right angles to the general traffic flow as possible.
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Figure 5: Rule 10 (UK Traffic Separation Scheme)

Rule 11 states the application of rules 11-18. These sections deal with the
conduct of vessels progressing in sight of one another and in restricted visibility.

Rule 12 applies to sailing vessels. It stipulates all the procedures which a prudent
sailor would use to ensure that the vessel is not involved in a collision. It stipulates the
rules to be followed by two sailing vessel, and states which one should keep out of the
way of the other. If a sailing vessel is approaching a power driven vessel, rule 18 would
be applicable (responsibilities between vessels).
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Rule 13 applies to an overtaking situation, and states clearly that while overtaking
vessels must stay well clear of each other. The test which was used for a long time to
determine whether or not a vessel was crossing or overtaking was whether the ‘hinder
ship’ could see ‘any part of the side lights of the forward ship’144. If so, it is a crossing
situation. If not, it is overtaking. This rule is concerned with a vessel proceeding in the
same general direction as the other, and in sight of one another. It requires the overtaking
vessel to keep out of the way, and the overtaken vessel to hold course and speed. The
overtaking vessel apparently has the option of passing on either side of the vessel, but
this is subject to the rule on narrow channels which stipulates the right hand side of the
channel for the overtaken vessel.

Figure 6: Rule 13 (The Fogo)
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The duty of the overtaking vessel is to keep out of the way of the vessel being
overtaken. No special signals are required (except in a narrow channel). The overtaking
vessel must stay a safe distance away. Thus, in The Fogo145 the Trentbank overtook the
Fogo, but then altered her course a total of four degrees to port. The Trentbank was held
responsible for having bad look out and for passing too close to the Fogo when the
collision occurred.

Rule 14 deals with a head-on situation, where vessels are approaching each
other from the opposite direction. It states clearly that each is to alter her course to
starboard so that each can pass on the port side of the other. The alteration of the course
must be timely and sufficient to give safe clearance. Here, neither vessel has the right of
way over the other. The head-on situation exists where two power driven vessels in sight
of each other are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses. Thus in The
Ballylesson146, the Ballylesson had crossed from her starboard side of the channel, and
was making for a channel entrance when she spotted the masthead lights of another
vessel. Although the Ballylesson made certain evasive manoeuvres, and sounded all her
signals, the other vessel remained oblivious of her until the last minute. It was held that
the Belgulf Union was at fault in not seeing the Ballylesson earlier, and not altering to
starboard thereafter. However, the Ballylesson was in breach of the local rules of
navigation and the head-on rule. Apportionment of fault was Belgulf Union, two-thirds and
the Ballylesson, one-third.
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Figure 7: Rule 14 (The Ballylesson)

Rule 15 deals with the crossing situation. Where two vessels are crossing each
other in a situation which may involve the risk of collision, the vessel which has the other
on her starboard is to “give way”. Thus, the duty of this ‘give way’ vessel is to keep clear
of the other vessel. She may keep clear without crossing ahead in three ways: by altering
course to starboard so as to pass astern of the other ship; by reducing speed, allowing
the other ship to cross ahead; or by altering to port and turning some 360 degrees.
Whichever action is adopted, early and positive response is necessary in all such
situations. In The Aracelio Iglesias147, the collision took place in good visibility in the
Panama Bay. The Nidareid saw the Aracelio Iglesias leaving the canal and showing a
146
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green light. Her engines were stopped soon after. Although she was the ‘stand on’ vessel,
the Nidareid was correct in altering her course and assuming the risk of collision.

Figure 8 (Rule 15) (Aracello Iglecias)

Rule 16 goes into further detail about the action of the give-way vessel mentioned
in rules 14 and 15. The requirement is that this vessel is to take “early and substantial
action to keep well clear”. The give-way vessel may take different actions such as
reducing her speed, stopping and reversing. However, any and all actions undertaken by
the vessel must be in accordance with the practice of good seamanship, timely and
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substantial, and should leave the ‘stand-on’ vessel in no doubt as to what her actions
are148.

Rule 17 outlines the rights and duties of the “stand on” vessel. It is the duty of the
stand-on vessel to maintain her course and speed. She is not entitled to alter her course
and speed in a moment if there is ample time for the ship which is bound to give way to
discharge her duty. In The Reanoke149, Lord Alverstone, C.J. elaborated on the meaning
of ‘course and speed’, which he defined as that ‘following the nautical manner’. He went
on to state that the question of whether the manoeuvre is necessary and proper in terms
of seamanship should always be asked. In this case the vessel (the stand-on vessel)
reduced her speed to pick up a pilot. It was held that where a stand on ship was, to the
knowledge of the give way ship, properly engaged in an ordinary nautical manoeuvre of
that type, she was entitled to carry it out even though it involved a reduction of speed. In
many cases, the stand-on ship will be judged with some degree of leniency if she does
take the wrong action when put in a position of difficulty.

The theme behind the collision regulations points to three different situations. One
where there is a head-on situation, both vessels must take some action to change the
existing situation. They are both required to alter course to starboard, and neither can
claim that the other should have taken any action first. In the second situation, there is the
overtaking situation. Here one vessel shall maintain the status quo, and the other will take
the positive action. Thus, the collision will be avoided if one vessel continues with what
she was doing. The third situation takes place where the stand on vessel realises that the
expected circumstances are not going to be fulfilled. Thus, if this is the case, the stand on
vessel is now given the right to take an evasive action.
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Rule 18 outlines the responsibilities that vessels owe to each other in various
circumstances. This rule opens by stating that it does not apply in three situations: Where
there is a narrow channel, a traffic separation scheme and in an overtaking situation.
Thus paragraphs (a) to (c) outlines which vessels shall keep out of the way of other
vessels. Manoeuvrability is the test for priority among the various categories of vessels.
Thus, the right of way is based upon the ability to deviate from course. Paragraph (d), on
the other hand, speaks to the situation where a vessel is constrained by her draught, and
states that she must navigate with particular caution, having full regard to her special
condition. Thus, a vessel constrained by her draught enjoys a special privilege when
exhibiting signals as stipulated under rule 28. Other vessels with lesser privilege will
therefore be under a duty to avoid impeding her safe passage.

Rule 19 states the required conduct of vessels in situations of limited or restricted
visibility. The word ‘navigating ‘ is considered germane to the application of the rule, and
the rule would not apply to a vessel lying dead in the water with her engines stopped.
However, a vessel which has stopped in order to allow the passage of traffic may not be
considered innocent if a collision followed, depending on the circumstances in the case.
Paragraph (b) refers to safe speed as provided for in rule 6, which applies in any type of
visibility. It also reiterates the fact that restricted visibility has to be taken into account
when determining safe speed. Paragraph (d) requires a vessel which detects by radar
alone to use the radar for determining whether or not a close quarters situation develops
or the risk of collision is likely. It also states certain manoeuvres which should be avoided
at all costs150.
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5.2.3

Parts C, D and E

These parts deal with the various light and sound signals to be used or exhibited
in various conditions. Although in themselves very important to navigation and the
avoidance of collisions, they will not be discussed in detail here. In brief, however, Part C
deals with lights and shapes (rules 20-31) to be exhibited in different situations. Part D
deals with sound and light signals, and part E deals with the possible exemptions from
compliance with the regulations regarding such sounds and lights.

The majority of changes brought about by the introduction of the 1972 Collision
Regulations are centred in Part B, which are the steering and sailing rules. The other
three parts have not changed significantly in any way, but the various lights, sounds and
shapes are equally important for the avoidance of collisions. In fact, the 1983 and 1989
revisions to the COLREGS have indeed changed some aspects of Part C. Parts D and E
will not be dealt with here. They are both straightforward and can be taken as they stand.
However, some consideration of Part C (Lights and Shapes) will be made.

The opening rule (rule 20) describes the application of the Part. It applies to ALL
weather conditions. No light may be exhibited which could be mistaken for the lights
specifically mentioned in the rules, and the period of applicability is (understandably)
sunset to sunrise, except in periods of restricted visibility. Thus, in The Ouro Fino151,
where the Rimac collided with a dumb barge in the care of the Ouro Fino, it was held that
the barge was anchored improperly, and better care should have been paid to advertising
her presence with anchor lights.

Rule 21 contains the definition and description for each type of light. Each one is
specified with respect to colour, position and arc of visibility. The current rules define the
arc in terms of degrees, and not the points of the compass as the older rules did. Rule 22
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deals with the range of visibility, which is determined in meters. Paragraph (d) requires
that an inconspicuous, partly submerged vessel or object being towed should have white
all round lights visible from a distance of three miles.

Rule 24 has the requirements for vessels involved in pushing or towing, and Rule
25 and 26 lay down the requirements for vessels under oar, sailing and fishing vessels.
Rule 27 lays down the expected lights to be displayed by vessels not under command, or
restricted in their ability to manoeuvre. Included here is a vessel involved in a towing
operation which may be unable to deviate from her course. The meaning of the words 'not
under command' is extended by the inclusion of the words 'through some exceptional
circumstances is unable to manoeuvre as required by these rules…' In fact, dredgers
engaged in underwater operation are mentioned specifically in these rules. Paragraph (g)
exempts vessels of less than 12 metres in length from exhibiting lights and shapes
prescribed by the rule (unless the vessel is involved in diving operations). Rule 28 permits
a vessel constrained by her draught to exhibit a special additional identification sign.

Thus, these 'Rule of the Road', evolved over centuries of sea usage and common
sense, have in there own way brought an element of sanity to navigation, particularly in
the case of specific or trying circumstances. However, no matter how clear, detailed and
comprehensive the regulations may be, human weakness is a factor which can override
them. That, more than anything else, is what will eventually determine whether or nor an
accident will occur.

151

[1988] 2 Ll. Rep. 325

68

6.

CONCLUSION

Collisions provide a wealth of fascinating legal fodder which could be used to
illustrate various issues, but closure is necessary. During the course of this paper, the
legal regime surrounding marine casualties, specifically collisions, has been outlined and
evaluated. The jurisdiction to try a collision case has been examined, and the various
types of liability which one may face have been discussed. Most importantly, the Collision
Regulations themselves, specifically the Steering and Sailing Rules of Part B have been
detailed. Why then do collisions still occur, not as an occasional unlucky encounter, but
with alarming frequency?

There are those who believe that the answer to this all -important question lies in
the Collisions Regulations themselves. In fact, recent proposals have been made
concerning the need to review the Collision Regulations. These arguments revolve
around the form that the new rules would take, rather than any matters of 'concept and
philosophy', but I believe that this will not in essence assist the reduction of the number of
collisions which are taking place.

Roger Syms, from the Australian Maritime College, has written a number of papers
on the reform of the COLREGS152. His main arguments for the reform of the COLREGS
are, firstly, that the rules are not sufficiently understood, particularly Rule 17. Secondly,
there is the complaint that there are too many rules, and the roles have become blurred
because of the change in 'social imperatives'. Thus, the rules must not only mitigate to
prevent loss of life and damage to property, but must also prevent ecological damage.
Thirdly, there is the argument that the change in technology has made it necessary to
completely revamp the rules.
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Although no body of rules is perfect, and as such there is always room for
improvement, one must act with considered moderation at all times. I disagree with all of
the above arguments on the grounds that they fail to take into account the realities of
shipping and attempt to paint a gloss over the real difficulties which have caused
collisions.

The first argument, that the rules are not sufficiently understood, has some merit
in the sense that it is possible that a mariner may, either through ignorance or a language
difficulty, be unable to fully understand the rules as they stand. The judicial interpretation
of the COLEGS has been notoriously complex and fraught with 'legalese'. However, the
additional argument that the rules are written in language that is too technical does a
disservice not only to mariners themselves, but also to the various training institutions
around the world. The language is neither too technical nor out of the grasp of a technical
person who is familiar with and uses all the equipment and terms incorporated in the
COLREGS on a regular basis. The mariner is also not required to quote the rules
verbatim at any or all times. He must, however, understand that in a certain situation,
specific action is required. It is admitted that in some occasions a misunderstanding of a
technical point may lead to a rash and incorrect reaction on the part of a mariner faced
with a difficult situation, but I believe that no matter the phrasing, there will always be
room for error on the part of man in such a situation.

The specific attack of Rule 17 speaks to the actions of the 'stand-on' vessel in any
encounter. Arguments have revolved around the fact that this concept has sprung from
the 19th Century ships, and that present circumstances have changed. It also attacks the
requirement that a 'stand-on' vessel maintain her course initially. This argument does not
seem to take account of the requirement in rule 17(a)(ii) which then permits the vessel to
take action if she sees that the 'give way' vessel is not 'giving way'. The fact remains that
152
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all circumstances cannot be factored into the regulations, and it is necessary to allow the
person actually faced with each circumstance some amount of discretion to handle the
situation based on the facts. Thus, if the circumstances are such that both incidents of
draft, speed and proximity make it prudent, then the stand-on vessel should, perhaps, act
as soon as the incident requires. The Rule is necessary, however, to outline some of the
necessary courtesies and prevent a grand free-for-all in the face of impending danger.

The next argument is that there are too many rules, many of which have become
blurred as a result of the changing social imperative. The specific example cited was that
of now having to consider ecological disaster as well as protection of life and property
when applying the rules. This is the most spurious argument of the lot. Whereas I can find
some viability in the other arguments, this one is devoid of all value. The reason for my
opinion is that the Collision Regulations were formulated to prevent collisions. That is all.
The question of the carriage of certain cargoes and the actions or clean-up activities to
be pursued in the event of a collision are not covered by the Collision Regulations, but
rather are covered by many other conventions and agreements on specific subjects. This
point is a non-issue in my mind.

The last argument that I will discuss is the belief that the Collision Regulations
need to be changed to take into account new technology. It is true that changes in
technology will make it necessary at intervals to effect some change to the Rules. This is
what was done in the case of the use of Radar, and also philosophically with the
development and adoption of Traffic Separation Schemes. However, at this point, it is not
necessary to formulate a full scale revamping of the Regulations without having the
technology to include. The revisions which have been made to the COLREGS in 1983,
1989 and 1991 have ensured that developing technology has been included, but at the
same time the spirit of the COLREGS has been unaffected. Hence, the actual COLREGS,
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although amended to incorporate the technological advances, have not needed to be
changed significantly.

It is my opinion that, having said all of the above, and having spent the majority of
the paper outlining liability and fault in collision cases, human error is largely to blame for
the majority of collisions that take place across the world. The Collision Regulations, as
with almost regulations, set a standard of behaviour for those travelling the waterways of
the earth. It is important to note that these rules are necessary for consistency of action,
and that there is room for discretion in situations where it is necessary to avoid a collision.
It is important to point out that although advances have been made in addressing the
problem of human error through other conventions dealing with manning, and certification
and hours of work, this is not the end of the problem. Many of these accidents take place
not because of fatigue or confusion vis-à-vis language and instructions (although that can
play a major role in both the fore and aftermath), but rather because of awkward
manoeuvring, bad look out, ignoring the regulations, speeding and violation of port rules. I
feel that until such time as the individuals manning these vessels come to some sort of
emotional and psychological agreement and begin to exercise more care in their
manoeuvres, collisions will continue to be a major problem in the shipping world, costing
billions of dollars in lost revenues, property damage, clean up operations and, of course,
legal fees.

It is my belief that the Collision Regulations are a good guide for courteous and
prudent shipping. Change is inevitable, but not for the reasons given. Too often do well
educated, intelligent people swallow the placebo that a change in a rule will cure all ills.
This can never be so. What need to be done is to change the outlook and attitude of
those who apply the rules. The vast majority of mariners are responsible, experienced
people, but as with land travel, even the most experienced individual can allow his
attention to waver or his judgement to be clouded. The amount of reaction time needed to
affect a proper evasive manoeuvre on the sea is far greater than on land, and a simple
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omission can have grave consequences. All is not lost, however. Once we address the
attitude of those who need to apply the rules, then their effectiveness can be truly
evaluated. It is my hope that those who advocate a radical change to the COLREGS take
heed of the true reasons behind many incidents, and perform their study and amendment
objectively.
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Figure 11: The Tojo Maru
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